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We weren't looking for a better life, we were just looking for life.1 
  
I. Introduction. 
The inflows of asylum seekers have greatly increased since the start of the years 2000 and are expected 
to continue to grow in the future. This has prompted a debate among policy makers, politicians and scholars 
on the possibility of influencing the inflows – possibly at their source – with instruments of economic policy. 
Naturally, the attention has turned to foreign Aid, one of the very few instruments available at the international 
level. However, opinions on its efficacy and even its effects differ widely. At one extreme, Aid is conceived 
as a way of helping countries to overcome the crisis that generates the flows of refugees, and hence to eliminate 
the reasons for seeking refuge abroad. At the other, it is seen as extra economic means provided to resource-
constrained individuals, who will use them to move to rich countries. 
This difference in opinions is present among politicians, and partly also among scholars. In particular, 
economists traditionally considered refugee movements a political phenomenon and devoted more attention 
to the determinants of the voluntary international migration (Van Hear, 2011). Moreover, they analysed 
foreign Aid less than other potential determinants. Perhaps because of this, empirical studies on the link Aid 
– bilateral refugee flows are scarce and results heterogeneous. Among the few exceptions, Thielemann (2004) 
finds that Aid transfers as a share of GDP positively affect asylum applications in 20 OECD countries during 
1985-1999; Neumayer (2005), instead, finds that Aid has no effect on asylum applications in Western Europe 
during 1982-1999. 
This paper seeks to measure the impact of bilateral Aid on asylum seeker inflows from 113 sending 
countries in 14 OECD destination countries for each year over the period 1993-2013. In principle, by 
improving living and economic conditions in the recipient country, Aid both discourage and support refugee 
migration. As either result can depend on countries’ conditions, I test whether Aid effects vary with the level 
of development of origin countries. Further tests concern the impact of bilateral Aid on voluntary bilateral 
migration. They help to compare the potential effects of Aid on asylum seekers and immigrants, and shed light 
on its overall impact. A rich array of fixed effects, lagged values and different specifications are used to control 
for potential endogeneity and the robustness and sensitivity of results. 
International norms treat migrants and refugees differently. The 1951 Refugee Convention defines a 
refugee a person who “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his 
nationality, and is unable to, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that 
country.” The two types of movements, forced and voluntary, seem to differ also empirically. A refugee is a 
person who flees the home country to escape war or persecution, but would rather not leave. The refugee does 
not choose the destination, nor the destination chooses her, as it would happen in a totally voluntary setting. 
On the other hand, a migrant is a person who leaves the country for any other reason and chooses where to 
                                                            
1 Bilal Askaryar, NPR, January 28, 2017. 
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move given a clearly defined set of alternatives and opportunities, including the destination country’s policies 
on immigration (Dustmann et al. 2016).  
While forced migration is as old as human history, only from the end of the second world war 
international Aid is officially recognized as a transfer of resources from one country to another in the form of 
donations and, as a minor share, of grants. As stated by the OECD, Aid has the goal of improving living 
conditions in the recipient country: ‘Official Development Aid (ODA) is administered with the promotion of 
the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective’. In fact, the reasons for 
providing Aid were often independent from real needs in the recipient country. (Boone, 1996; Alesina and 
Dollar, 2000; Collier and Dollar, 2002; Lancaster, 2007, Jones 2015). This suggests they may have also been 
independent from the causes of refugee flows. 
This study’s main findings are as follows. Bilateral Aid affects asylum seeker inflows nonlinearly in the 
average income of the origin country. Specifically, it reduces asylum applications from poor countries and 
encourages them from medium-income developing ones. In particular, the deterring effect is stronger on 
applications from Sub Saharan Africa. In addition, Aid has cross-donor spillover effects of negative sign: more 
Aid from other donors lowers the number of asylum applications in the OECD destination. Furthermore, 
bilateral Aid to the region surrounding a recipient country affect asylum inflows from that country. At the 
same time, bilateral Aid has no effect on bilateral migration. Hence, bilateral Aid can influence the inflows of 
asylum applicants without, as a side effect, influencing those of immigrants. The rest of the paper is organized 
as follows. Section 2 reviews and resumes the related literature, Section 3 presents data sources and descriptive 
statistics, Section 4 describes the estimation strategy, Section 5 presents and discusses results, and Section 6 
concludes. 
 
II. Related literature 
There has been more empirical investigation on the determinants of voluntary migration than on those 
of refugee movements. Several studies find that the main determinants of voluntary migration are economic, 
and among these the most important are per capita income and income growth in origin and receiving 
countries.  In Hatton and Williamson (2005), Mayda (2010), Grogger and Hanson (2011), Ortega and Peri 
(2013), and several other authors, bilateral migration positively depends on the difference between average 
incomes in destination and origin countries. A positive effect of income at destination is in Bauer and 
Zimmermann (1998), Hartog and Vriend (1989), Katseli and Glystos (1989), and Lundborg (1991). These 
findings suggest that emigration decreases with development in the origin economy (Ortega and Peri, 2013, 
find a negative effect of per capita income on emigration). However, other studies find that an increase of per 
capita income in the origin country initially boosts emigration, and has the opposite effect only after a certain 
stage of development. This bell-shaped function of emigration in average income is present in Martin and 
Taylor (1996), de Haas (2007) and other authors. Using cross-country data Clemens (2014) provides evidence 
on an inverted ‘U’ relation between migration and development. The author hypothesises that the inverted 
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bell-shaped relation could hold also in the long-run, a length of time longer than that of most panel databases. 
Other significant economic causes of migration, among which unemployment, are reviewed and tested in 
Docquier et al. (2014). 
Other determinants of voluntary migration concern political and institutional factors. Aid, as a potential 
cause of migration, has received less attention than other factors. Among the exceptions is the book Aid in 
Place of Migration?, edited by  Böhning et al. (1994), which contains several studies on the link Aid-
migration. However, as Martin (1994) recognizes in the epilogue, they reach different and contrasting results. 
Faini and Venturini (1993) hypothesise a non-linear relationship between Aid and development, with Aid 
initially fostering emigration from poor countries, where would-be migrants face resource constraints, and 
exerting the opposite effect after they reach a certain level of average income. Similar hypotheses are in Schiff 
(1994), Vogler et al. (1997), and Vogler and Rotte (2000).  Berthélemy et al. (2009), using cross-country data 
from a wide set of countries, finds that bilateral Aid encourages migration from the poorest economies and 
reduces it from less poor ones. Also analysing a cross-section of countries, Belloc (2015) finds a positive 
relationship, in this case linear, between foreign Aid and total emigration from South Saharan countries. In 
Nyberg Sørensen et al. (2003), Aid to poor countries has no unique effects on migration to rich economies. 
The authors test also the impact of Aid transfers to neighbouring economies of countries in political crisis. In 
a press article, (Clemens and Sandefur, 2015) state that the Aid-development-migration nexus is positive: 
more Aid to poor countries boosts immigrant flows to rich economies.   
Regarding the potential determinants of refugee migration, Marfleet (2006), Schmeidl (1997), 
Davenport et al. (2003), Moore and Shellman (2007) and Hatton (2009) find protest and oppression, conflict, 
and genocide in the home country significantly affect the stocks of refugees. Looking at the determinants of 
asylum applications in Western countries, Neumayer (2005) finds that they largely coincide with those of 
refugees, but political drivers are stronger for refugee migrations, while economic incentives dominate for 
voluntary migrants. However, refugees and asylum seekers also respond to economic factors. In Neumayer 
(2005) and Hatton (2009), levels and changes of per capita GDP in the origin country negatively influence 
them: outflows diminish with development. As seen above, among few others, Thielemann (2004) and 
Neumayer (2005) specifically focus on the effects of Aid on refugees and asylum seekers. 
 
III. Data and descriptive statistics 
From 1950, the United Nations High Commissioner for refugees (UNHCR) provides standardized cross-
country data on refugees and asylum seekers. From 1969, the main source of standardized data on the Official 
Development Aid (ODA) provided and received by countries is the OECD statistics division. I built a panel 
database by using data from UNHCR extracted from OECD Statistics on the asylum applications submitted 
by people from 113 developing countries in 14 destination economies – Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom and United States 
–each year during 1993-2013. Asylum seekers are individuals who have sought international protection and 
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whose claims for refugee status have not yet been determined (UNHCR). Data on countries that gained 
independence after the fall of the Soviet Union are available only from 1993; hence, this is the initial year of 
the dataset. Asylum applications from the list of 113 origin countries account for almost 80% of all asylum 
application in the selected OECD destinations (and 70% of asylum applications in all Western OECD 
countries), during the period considered. Data on foreign Aid, regarding the Official Development Assistance 
(ODA: net disbursements) from each donor/destination country to each recipient/origin is extracted from 
OECD Statistics. A complete list of variables and sources, together with the list of origin countries, is in Table 
A.1.  
From the last two decades, Aid and bilateral asylum seeker inflows experienced some important 
changes.  Because of the fall of the Berlin wall, the level of asylum applications was high at the beginning of 
the period, but fell rapidly afterwards. Many refugees from the former republics of the Soviet Union returned 
home, and fewer asylum seekers moved to the selected OECD destinations (Figure 1). Another important 
wave of asylum seeker inflows – still underway and expected to last for the next years – started with the 
terrorist attacks of 9/11/2001 and the subsequent military conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Balkans’ 
ethnic conflicts, the ‘Arab spring’ in Middle Eastern and North African countries, and political turmoil in 
countries of Sub Saharan Africa, also determined substantial increases in asylum applications in OECD 
countries. Similarly, bilateral Aid falls at the start of the period considered. Subsequently, it grows from 2000 
until 2006, to decrease again afterwards.  
The main turns and changes in the paths of bilateral Aid and asylum applications partly coincide with 
modifications in the list of top origin and recipient countries. Table A.2 lists the twenty top origin countries 
of asylum applications and bilateral Aid recipients during 1993-2000 and 2001-2013. It shows that there are 
fewer applicants from Eastern Europe in the second period, and more from the Middle East South Saharan 
Africa. 
 
IV. Estimation strategy 
In order to study the correlations between foreign Aid and asylum inflows, I use dynamic panel 
regressions. The dependent variable is the number of asylum applications each year in the destination country. 
The base regression is:  
 
lnYodt =  + lnYodt-1Todt + Oot + Ddt + odt,                                                    (1) 
where Yodt is the (log of the) number of asylum applications of individuals from country o in country d during 
year t, and lnYodt-1 its lagged value. Todt includes dyadic variables. First among these is the variable of interest, 
bilateral Aid provided by the OECD country d to developing country o; its effect can be positive or negative 
depending on whether it provides more incentives to remain or resources needed to flee the country, and on 
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whether it affects individuals’ preferences for the donor across possible destinations.2 Other  dyadic variables 
are: distance between origin and destination, meant to capture the effective cost of international migration and 
cultural dissimilarity between countries; stocks of migrants from country o in country d at time t, a proxy of 
family and social network ties; a time-invariant dummy taking value one if the origin country was a colony of 
the destination economy in 1945 and zero otherwise, accounting for similarity in institutions, language and 
culture between origin and destination, supposed to decrease the costs of migration. Oot  comprises origin 
country variables, which are: Aid received from all countries other than d, which, as above, can provide 
reasons for not leaving and means for doing so, and include an ‘attraction for the donor’ component (in this 
case, for a country different from d); GDP per capita, the main proxy for development and individuals’ 
resources, which can boost or deter asylum seeker flows; population, which accounts for the size of the 
country; the degree of political terror and the lack of civil liberties, both potentially important push factors 
(Hatton, 2004 , Neumayer, 2004); natural disasters (proxied by the number of deaths), also expected to be a 
push factor (Naudé, 2010, Neumayer, 2005); refugees to other countries (all countries other than d), expected 
to be positively related to asylum seeker applications in d, because some countries can be more prone to 
produce refugees than others (Moore and Shellman, 2007; Hatton and Williamson, 2005). Ddt includes terms 
concerning the destination country, they are: per capita GDP at destination, a proxy of expected earnings, 
potentially a pull factor for asylum seekers (Neumayer, 2004); population, an indicator of the extension of the 
labour market; the unemployment rate, signalling the likelihood of finding a job at destination, having an 
expected negative effect. Policies at destination concerning asylum seekers should also significantly influence 
the number of applications. As there are no standardized indicators on these policies, I use two proxies: the 
first, very imperfect in that it includes pull and push elements, is the rate of rejection of asylum demands from 
origin o in country d at year t. The second, more precise, is an index built by Hatton and Moloney (2015) 
based on yearly changes in the tightness of refugee policies in the selected countries.   
As said above, the impact of Aid on asylum inflows can be positive or negative depending on how 
individuals react to the availability of extra economic resources. In turn, this can depend on the resources they 
can already rely on, or, in other words, the level of development of the recipient economy. To test this 
hypothesis, subsequent specifications include the interaction between bilateral Aid and per capita income in 
the origin country:   
                                             
lnYodt = d + do + ot + dt + lnYodt-1 + Todt + ln Bilateral Aidodt)*(ln pc GDPoot) +Ddt + odt           
(2) 
 
                                                            
2 More aid to a country can intensify the attractiveness of the donor country for individuals of the recipient country. The presence 
of a donor in the recipient country, or projects funded by the donor, creates opportunities for contacts between the local population 
and the donor. More generally, it provides knowledge on the donor’s social norms, institutions and culture, all of which can 
decrease the costs of migration.  
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These more complete specifications will also include origin-by-year, destination-origin and destination 
fixed effects. The former should capture all time-varying terms that are constant across destinations d and only 
vary by year and country of origin. Destination-origin effects can account for time-invariant factors that affect 
each pair of origin-destination countries that are not captured by variables included in the regression. Dyadic 
time-invariant variables of the base specification will in this case be excluded because of collinearity. 
Destination fixed effects will account for factors of the destination country that are invariant or change very 
slowly along time, such as culture or institutions. In further regressions, destination-by-year will replace 
origin-by-year fixed effects. They are meant to capture time-varying terms that are constant across origins o 
and only vary by year and country of destination. In this case, all time varying variables of destination 
countries are excluded from the regressions because of collinearity. Symmetrically with respect to the previous 
specification, origin fixed effects will be included to account for time-invariant factors at origin.   
Endogeneity and reverse causation can be an issue if Aid and asylum seekers influence each other. Using 
a panel dataset on 18 donor and 148 recipient countries during the period 1992-2003, Czaika and Mayer (2011) 
find that asylum seekers and refugees in the destination economy positively affect bilateral Aid.3 Using 
specifications similar to those of Czaika and Mayer, I test the effect of flows of asylum applications and 
refugee stocks on bilateral Aid with data from the present study’s database, more extended in time. 
These tests, however, are not conclusive. The variable asylum seekers can be autoregressive, which can 
reintroduce the problem of endogeneity in specifications (1)-(2). They include the lagged dependent variable 
as a regressor, but even this can be not sufficient if, for example, the mere increase in asylum applications in 
country d triggers a response in terms of Aid to their home country. To control for this possibility, in a further 
specification, independent variables are lagged five periods. Short-term confounding factors and reverse 
causality of asylum seekers on Aid are arguably less of a concern with longer time lags in the explanatory 
variables. Moreover, a five-year interval allows a fuller response of asylum inflows to variation of bilateral 
Aid and of other variables. Finally, a still more complete specification will include both destination-time and 
origin-time fixed effects together with destination-origin and time dummies. This is a very demanding 
specification, as it absorbs all bilateral-specific factors as well as origin and destination time varying factors. 
Measurement will therefore be entirely concentrated on within country-pair time variations.   
 
V. Results  
V.1. Base specifications 
Results of the estimation of equations (1)-(2) are in Table 1.  The dependent variable is the log of the 
annual applications for asylum – plus one – for each country pair. Adding one allows me to keep the 
                                                            
3 In Czaika and Mayer, asylum seekers affect bilateral Aid more than refugee stocks. This result can be unexpected because refugees 
(applicants who in the past obtained the permanent refugee status) had more time to integrate into the country’s society and economy, 
form ethnic networks, and become able to influence Aid transfers. Asylum applicants reached the country only recently and face a 
substantial chance of not becoming refugees (rejection rates are above 58%, Table A.3), which can make them less able to affect 
the country’s choices on Aid. 
8 
 
information from the zero-flow observations.4 Variables regarding Aid, such as Bilateral Aid and Aid all 
others, are lagged one period to allow their effects to influence asylum seekers. The main hypothesis is that 
Bilateral Aid transfers can influence asylum inflows from the origin (recipient) to the destination (donor) 
country, but coefficient on the variable is not signed a priori. All specifications include a time trend and year 
fixed effects; the OLS-FE specifications include also country effects (2-5), in further specifications 
country*time fixed effects are added (columns 6-9). 
The pooled OLS estimates provide a first idea of how the data are correlated without controlling for 
country fixed effects, and therefore overestimate the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable.  The latter 
spans from 0.86 in the OLS specification of column 1 to 0.54 in the OLS-FE specification of column 6, 
showing that asylum applications are persistent when lagged one period. However, the coefficient further 
shrinks – in column 7 – and becomes not significant – in columns 8 and 9 – when the lag comprises five years. 
This lack of persistence in the longer run can derive from the changes in asylum inflows that occurred during 
the timespan considered (Figure 1, Table 1). 
Our variable of interest, Bilateral Aid, has no significant effect on the dependent variable (columns 1-
3). A similar result is in Neumayer (2005). More interestingly, when nonlinearity in average income is taken 
into account, coefficients on both Bilateral Aid and the interacted variable (Bilateral Aid) *(pc GDPo) are 
significant (columns 4 and 6-9). The signs – negative on Bilateral Aid and positive on the interaction – show 
that the total effect of bilateral Aid on asylum seeker inflows is negative for the poorest countries and positive 
for the medium income (developing) ones. The total effect of total bilateral Aid is calculated summing the 
coefficients on bilateral Aid and on the interaction between bilateral Aid and per capita GDP of the origin 
country, evaluated a different levels of per capita GDP.  
Column 5 includes origin-time, destination, country-pair and time fixed effects, which excludes all time-
varying variables concerning origin countries because of collinearity. This specification takes into account the 
potential heterogeneity between leavers and non-leavers in origin countries (Ortega and Peri, 2013). The 
specification of column 6 substitutes origin-time with destination-time fixed effects that control for time 
varying factors not captured by the variables included in the regression, among which, for example as asylum 
and refugee policies in destination countries. To account for the possibility of endogeneity, the interacted 
variable, (Bilateral Aid) * (pc GDPo), and all cofactors are lagged five years in columns 7 - 9. Column 7 
includes origin-time fixed effects, together with destination, country-pair and time fixed effects, while column 
8 controls for destination-time effects. In them, results remain similar to those of column 4: the coefficient on 
bilateral Aid is negative and the coefficient on the interacted term is positive; both are significant at the 1% 
level. Column 9 reports the results of the more exacting specification, where all possible fixed effects are 
included – time, destination-origin, destination-time and origin-time (origin and destination fixed effects are 
‘absorbed’ by the destination-origin effects). Results concern only within country-pair variations. As in 
                                                            
4 Part of foreign Aid is concessional in character and conveys a grant element (OECD). As an effect of interest repayment, some 
figures are negative. However, they are a very small proportion of total observations, and have been substituted by zeros. 
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previous specifications, the number of asylum applicants originating from the poorest countries decreases and  
that from less poor ones increases as a consequence of Aid transfers. This complete array of fixed effects and 
the five-years’ lag help to rule out the existence of endogeneity.  
However, to further control for potential reverse causation, I test the direct influence of asylum seekers 
and refugee stocks on bilateral Aid. As in Czaika and Mayer (2011), I use OLS-FE – with FE concerning year, 
time, country and country-pair –, and PPLM – with the dependent variable in levels and zeros included as in 
the original data –. Results are in Table A.4. Coefficients on refugee stocks are significant, but the flows of 
asylum applicants have no effect on the bilateral Aid of the destination country. This result provides further 
support to the conclusion that endogeneity can be ruled out from the nexus bilateral Aid-asylum seekers of 
Table 1.  
Further findings concern the influence of economic and political characteristics of origin and destination 
countries on asylum applications. Concerning the origin country, coefficients show that asylum applications 
diminish as per capita income increases. In the pooled OLS and the FE specifications of columns 1 and 2, 
coefficients on pc GDPo are negative and significant. In column 2, a 10% increase in average income 
diminishes asylum applications by about 3.9%, significance at 1%. This supports previous findings in Hatton 
(2009) and Neumayer (2005). To control for the linearity of this effect, I include the squared term of per capita 
income in column 3. Results on pc GDPo and pc GDPo^2 are that the coefficient on the main term is non-
significant, and that on the squared term is negative and significant at 10%. This supports the above finding 
that development in the home country reduces the number of potential asylum seekers moving to the OECD 
destination. Moreover, in the subsequent specifications the total effect of pc GDPo is calculated as the sum of 
the coefficient on the variable and on the interacted term, evaluated at the average value of Bilateral Aid: it 
turns out to be always negative and significant (columns 3-9).  
As expected, political characteristics of the origin countries strongly influence asylum seeker inflows. 
Coefficients on Political terror and lack of Civil liberties are always high and significant. A 10% decrease in 
political terror lowers the number of asylum applications in the OECD destination by 3.87% (column 6). The 
effect is long lasting: after 5 years, applications decrease by 3.18% (column 8). Significance is always at 1%. 
Similarly, a 10% increase in civil liberties decreases asylum applications by 2.08% (column 6), and by 1.22% 
after five years (column 8).  These results provide support to Moore and Shellman (2007), where high levels 
of dissident violence and government terror increase the number of refugees relative to the number internally 
displaced. 
Some countries can be more prone to produce refugees than others (Moore and Shellman, 2007). 
Coefficients on Refugees to other countries (all countries other than d) are positive and significant in all 
specifications, except column 8, where the variable is lagged 5 years; this is consistent with the changes in 
asylum flows occurred during the last two decades (Figure 1). Natural disasters appear to have no effect on 
the inflows of asylum seekers in the OECD destination. A similar result is in Moore and Shellman (2007) and 
Clemens (2014). Neumayer (2005) finds that natural disasters and famine generate internal or cross border 
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migration, rather flight to distant destinations. The result can suggest that people regard natural disasters as 
temporary phenomena that will be overcame and pose no need of leaving for a distant destination. However, 
disaggregated results in the next Section show that the response to natural disasters is heterogeneous across 
world regions. 
Regarding the destination country, as expected, a higher unemployment rate discourages asylum 
seekers. Specifically, if unemployment at destination increases by 1 percentage point, asylum applications 
diminish from 2.4% to 2.8 % in columns 1-5, and by 10.7%, in column 7; significance is always at 1%. The 
result, robust to all specifications, supports previous findings (Thielemann, 2004). On the other hand, average 
income at destination is not significant. A similar result is in Hatton (2016) and other studies on refugees and 
asylum seekers. It suggests that asylum seekers value the prospect of employment more than the expected 
level of wages. This differs from empirical findings on voluntary migration, where income at destination tends 
be a strong and robust pull factor.  
Also as expected, migrant networks at destination and institutional and cultural similarity between origin 
and destination country, positively affect asylum applications. Moreover, distance between origin and 
destination significantly reduces the inflows of asylum seekers. This is consistent with empirical data showing 
that the great majority of world asylum seekers and refugees move to near countries, and only a minority 
migrate to the more distant OECD destination.5 None of the origin countries in the sample are located in the 
same region of, or share a border with, the selected rich Western economies. 
What are the effects of bilateral Aid, negative and positive, at different levels of income? Moreover, 
what would the costs of Aid policies be? To compute the total effect of bilateral Aid at different level of per 
capita income, I use the coefficients of the most complete specification, of column 9. In it, an increase of 10% 
in bilateral Aid to poor countries, such as Burundi, Eritrea, Liberia, Malawi, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Central African Republic or Afghanistan, reduces the number of applicants by about 0.06%. The same 
increase in bilateral Aid to medium income developing economies, such as Turkey, Libya, Chile, Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait or United Arab Emirates, rises the number of applicants by about 0.05%. Significance for 
negative and positive coefficients is at 5%. In an intermediate subset of countries, bilateral Aid has no effect. 
From this follows that an increase of 10% of bilateral Aid to, for example, Eritrea, which corresponds to extra 
$914,200 (the average bilateral Aid to the country is $9.142 million, with the increase is $10.06 million), leads 
to 23 fewer applications (the average number of asylum applications from Eritrea is 376.4, multiplied by the 
above coefficient of – 0.06, gives – 23). Hence, the ‘cost’, in terms of Aid transfers, of reducing applications 
from Eritrea by one unit is $39,748. Similar calculations applied to Afghanistan – a stronger Aid recipient but 
also a wider source of asylum seekers – show that a 10% increase in bilateral Aid to the country, which 
                                                            
5 Hatton (2009) reports that ‘[o]nly a small proportion of those who are displaced become asylum seekers in Western countries and 
fewer still are accepted as genuine refugees. The applications to industrialised countries are on average less than 5% of the refugee 
stock [during 1970-2005]. Most of those who are counted as refugees by the UNHCR are displaced into neighbouring countries and 
often into the poverty and squalor of refugee camps near the border.’, pg. 187.  
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corresponds to $14.47 million of extra transfers, determines a decrease of 77 applications. Hence, the ‘cost’ 
of each non-application from Afghanistan is $187,922. 
Aid donations made by countries generate negative cross-donor spillovers. In Table 1, the coefficient 
on Aid from all others, concerning the transfers of all countries except d to country o, is negative and 
significant: a 10% increase in Aid from all others lowers the flows of asylum seekers from o to d by 0.04% 
(column 6). The effect persists after a five-year interval (column 8). These negative and significant cross-
country spillover effects can be driven by the well-known opposing forces concerning, on the one hand, 
stronger incentives to remain in the home country, on the other, more resources to leave, and a third factor: 
fewer people, among those leaving, move to the OECD destination. Presumably, they will be attracted by the 
(non-d) donor country. The aggregate result is a reduction in the flows to the OECD destination. Indirectly, 
this supports the hypothesis of Aid transfers comprising an ‘attraction for the donor’ component, which in this 
case deviates flows from the OECD destination.6  
 
V.2 World regions 
This Section presents the results of testing the impact of Aid and the other main cofactors disaggregated 
into world areas. One implication of the effect of bilateral Aid being nonlinear in income is that it can be 
expected to vary across world regions with different levels of development. A related issue concerns the 
possibility of bilateral Aid to the area surrounding the origin country affecting asylum seekers from that 
country. Asylum seekers in a country located near to the home country face different options, such as staying 
in the host country, returning to the homeland, moving to a destination other than d, or migrating to donor 
country d. To test the influence of this indirect effect, I add the variable Bilateral Aid region to the above 
regressions, which reports the Aid provided by donor d to countries in the region surrounding o (Regions are 
listed in Table A.3). A negative coefficient on Bilateral Aid region implies that any (or a mix) of the first three 
options prevails, while a positive coefficient is the result of the choice to move from the temporary shelter 
plus the ‘attraction’ effect exerted by d.   
Results are in Table 2. In order to keep the coefficients on all time-varying cofactors, I use a specification 
that controls for trend, time and country-pair effects, but do not include country-time effects.7 Coefficients are 
obtained by multiplying Bilateral Aid, pc GDPo and the interaction term with a categorical variable on world 
                                                            
6 A world economy with competitive countries minimizing the expenditure in Aid for given levels of a social welfare function and 
negative Aid spillovers can be characterized by multiple equilibria. Given world transfers to a specific destination, a donor can 
choose to reduce its own attraction effect and benefit from the attraction for other donors by reducing its Aid transfers. However, a 
generalized move of this kind would produce inferior equilibria: it would significantly worsen living conditions in the poorest 
countries, leading to an increase in asylum inflows from them (Table 1). Jones (2015) finds evidence of positive bandwagon effects, 
especially among larger donors.   
7 It corresponds to the specification of column 4 in Table 1. In Table 1, coefficients on bilateral Aid of columns 4 and 9 (the most 
exacting specification) do not differ significantly between them. The total effect of bilateral Aid, calculated as the sum of the 
coefficient on bilateral Aid and on the interacted variable, evaluated at the average level of per capita income at origin, is 0.008 in 
column 4 and 0.01 in column 9. Hence, I use the specification that keeps most of the coefficients on cofactors, and allows comparing 
them across regions. 
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regions. All regressions include all cofactors, but for reasons of space, only coefficients on variables of interest 
are shown. 
Model 1 confirms that the above aggregate findings on bilateral Aid (in Table 1) were driven by 
countries in Sub Saharan Africa: coefficients on Bilateral Aid and the interacted variable are non-significant 
in all other world regions, except Eastern Europe. Results regarding Sub Saharan Africa (column 3) are not 
surprising, given that many of the poorest countries in the world are in this region, while those on Eastern 
Europe (column 1) are unexpected, because the per capita incomes of these countries are not low compared 
to those of other world regions. However, a closer examination of the data reveals that results in column 1, 
Model 1, depend on an outlier: Bosnia and Herzegovina. With the Kosovo war, asylum applications from this 
country rose substantially, and diminished rapidly afterwards. When I exclude this country from the sample, 
the magnitude of the coefficient on Bilateral Aid in column1 shrinks and loses significance. At the same time, 
coefficients on column 3, concerning Sub Saharan Africa, do not depend on specific economies.  
Aid transfers from country d to the area surrounding country o, Bilateral Aid area, significantly 
influence asylum seeker inflows from the African continent, but with opposite signs in the North and the South 
of the Sahara. They pull applicants from North Africa, and increase the incentives to stay in the South of the 
Sahara. In this region, the coefficient on Bilateral Aid area, – 0.034, significant at 10% (column 3, Model 2), 
reinforces direct influence of bilateral Aid, also negative. The two negative effects add up and are consistent 
with the mostly regional nature of asylum seeker movements in the area (Lucas 2006, UNCHR). In North 
Africa, the coefficient on Bilateral Aid area is positive and, in absolute value, stronger: 0.104, with 
significance at 1%. In this area, where direct Bilateral Aid has no significant effect, the pull effect of regional 
Aid concerns asylum seekers who have already fled the home country, and move to the OECD donor from a 
regional location. It can be observed that North Africa is also the region where political terror has the strongest 
push effect on asylum seekers (column 2).  
Coefficients on Aid from all others, all donors except the destination, d, are negative in all regions, 
except South and Central Asia (column 4). In line with the previous aggregate results of Table 1, Aid transfers 
from other donors to Africa, The Middle East, South America and Europe significantly decrease applications 
in the OECD destination. Differently, more Aid from other countries to South and Central Asia significantly 
increase asylum applications. This suggests a preference of asylum seekers from this region for the OECD 
destination, no matter what donor is providing Aid.  
Considered together, these disaggregated results help to highlight the importance and significance of 
political and economic factors in countries of different regions in influencing asylum seekers. The coefficients 
on Political terror and pc GDPo tend to be both significant, except in some cases where one or the other 
prevails. Specifically, political terror is the strongest push factor of asylum seekers from North Africa and 
North and Central America, two regions where per capita income has no significant influence on asylum 
applications. Among the two, the effect of Political terror in driving applications from North Africa 
(coefficient is 0.65) is strongest than on those from North and Central America (coefficient is 0.31; in both 
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cases significance is at 1%). On the other hand, economic conditions appear to drive applications from Far 
East Asia and Oceania, where political variables have no effect. At the same time, asylum applications from 
this region decrease rapidly with development: the coefficient on pc GDPo is – 0.61, significance is at 1% 
(Model 1, row 4).  
The coefficients on Civil liberties support these results, they are positive in all regions, except North 
Africa: a lack of civil liberties in the home country produces asylum flows to the Western economy (column 
2, Model 5). The atypical result in North Africa – lower levels of civil liberties at home are correlated with 
less asylum applications – can be motivated by the region, together with the Middle East and South and Central 
Asia, having the lowest levels of civil liberties, and, as already mentioned, the highest levels of political terror. 
This suggests that people are less able to move from the North African country and reach the OECD 
destination when obstacles to civil liberties increase.  As noted in de Haas (2010), lack of freedoms may 
decrease people’s capabilities to migrate. 
Interestingly, Natural disasters, which had no effect on asylum applications at the aggregate level, 
negatively and significantly affect asylum applications from South and Central Asia: a 10% increase in natural 
disasters reduces asylum seeker flows to the OECD destination by 0.4%, significance at 1% (column 4, Model 
6). The negative coefficient shows that people react differently to natural and political dangerous situations. 
While the latter represent strong incentives to leave, calamitous natural events, perhaps because they are 
perceived as transitory, or because of the ensuing reduction in economic resources, are a reason for not moving 
to the OECD destination.   
While the effects of push factors differ across world regions, the influence of pull forces appear to be 
more homogenous. Unemployment in the destination country, when significant, has a negative effect. 
Differently from expected, pc GDPd also has a negative effect (columns 7 and 8, Table 2). This, again, supports 
the hypothesis that asylum seekers value stability and employment opportunities at destinations more than the 
level of expected wages. Results also show that ethnic networks at destination, proxied by stocks of migrants 
from the home country, have a significant pull effect on asylum seekers from Sub Saharan Africa and Eastern 
Europe, but not on those from other regions. What is more, the coefficient on the variable is negative and 
significant for asylum applicants from South America (Columns 9). This negative coefficient helps to explain 
the non-robust aggregate effect of the variable Immigrant stocks in Table 1. In particular, it may imply that 
forced and voluntary immigrants from this region constitute different networks, which remain separate and do 
not overlap. 
 
V.3 Sensitivity and robustness. 
Up to now the variable of interest, Bilateral Aid, concerned the totality of Aid transfers (including 
development, education, trade, infrastructure, other purposes, and humanitarian Aid). The underlying 
hypothesis was that all Aid that improves living conditions in the recipient country could influence the choices 
- regarding staying, leaving, and destination - of potential refugees. However, it may be argued that people in 
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perilous and unsustainable situations might be more influenced by humanitarian Aid, which is specifically 
conceived for extreme conditions, than by broad donations that can reach them indirectly, if at all. Hence, in 
an alternative specification, a variable reporting data on Humanitarian bilateral Aid from d to o substitutes 
Bilateral Aid, and its effect on asylum seekers is tested. Data on humanitarian Aid are extracted from the same 
OECD dataset on foreign Aid that provides the data on Official Development Assistance used above. Results 
are not strictly comparable with those of previous regressions because observations on Humanitarian bilateral 
Aid are about 50% of those on Bilateral Aid. Moreover, the geographical distributions of the two types of Aid 
differ: humanitarian Aid is more concentrated in countries that are poor, politically dangerous and subject to 
natural disasters. Results are in column 1 of Table 3: the coefficient on Humanitarian bilateral Aid is negative, 
small, 0.025, and significant at the 1% level.8 To control whether also humanitarian Aid is nonlinear in the 
average income of the origin country, I added to the previous specification the interacted variable, 
(Humanitarian bilateral Aid) * (pc_GDP origin). Resulting coefficients on the main term and on the interacted 
variable, not shown to save space, are both not significant. Hence, humanitarian Aid has a deterring effect on 
asylum seeker inflows, and this effect is invariant in the origin countries’ average incomes. All specifications 
in Table 3 include time trend, time, country-pair and country fixed effects.   
In previous regressions, the influence of migrant networks in the destination country on the inflows of 
asylum applicants has been mixed: positive but not robust in the aggregate results of Table 1 and positive and 
significant only for Sub Saharan Africa and Eastern Europe in the disaggregated analysis of Table 2. To further 
analyse the impact of immigrants, I substitute the variable Immigrant stocks with Immigrant inflows (from the 
OECD dataset), concerning flows of migrants from o to d. Results show that, as expected, the coefficient is 
positive and significant, but small: a 10% increase in Immigrant inflows at destination increases asylum 
applications by only 0.47% (column 2, Table 3). Another possible explanation for the lack of robustness of 
coefficients on Immigrant stocks (in Table 1), and the positive but low coefficient on Immigrant inflows, is 
that perhaps asylum seekers  rely more on refugees – previously asylum applicants themselves – than on 
immigrants. If refugees and migrants in the host country have separate networks, different results may arise. 
The raw data appear to support this possibility: the simple correlation between asylum seekers and immigrant 
stocks is 0.35, while the correlation between asylum seekers and refugees is 0.74. However, the coefficient on 
the variable Refugees (stocks of refugees from country o in d) is not significant (column 3, Table 3). This 
result partially differs from Davenport et al. (2003), where past refugee migration positively influences refugee 
stocks (the dependent variable here is asylum applications).  
Another issue concerns the possibility of sample heterogeneity and structural break. As seen above, the 
intensity and geographical composition of asylum seeker flows and bilateral Aid transfers change during the 
period considered (Figure 1 and Table A.2). A question that naturally arises is whether the influence of 
                                                            
8 Nyberg Sørensen et al. (2003) state that ‘Aid selectivity tends to allocate development aid to the well performing countries and 
humanitarian assistance to the crisis countries and trouble spots. However, development aid is more effective than humanitarian 
assistance in preventing violent conflicts, promoting reconciliation and democratization, and encouraging poverty-reducing 
development investments by migrant diasporas.’, pg.6.   
15 
 
Bilateral Aid is homogeneous through time. A turning point is at the beginning of years 2000, when Aid grows 
and asylum application slightly decline; it can be related to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the 
United States, which lead to a tightening of several Western countries’ policies on immigration.  To test this 
possibility, Bilateral Aid is split into two periods. For the first period, it is multiplied to a dummy taking value 
1 in years 1993 to 2002 and zero otherwise, and for the second to a dummy with value 1 in years 2003-2013 
and zero otherwise (column 4, Table 3). Results show that coefficients on bilateral Aid and on the interacted 
variable do not differ significantly between the two periods. Hence, aggregate results are not heterogeneous 
through time. 
The empirical literature finds that destination countries’ policies and norms on the recognition of the 
status of refugee affect the flows of asylum seekers. A first, imperfect proxy of such policies is the proportion 
of rejected applications from country o in country d. UNHCR provides data on the rates of rejection only from 
year 2000. Results show that the variable Proportion of rejections has no significant effect on asylum seekers 
(column 5). The variable equals one minus the recognition rates used by Neumayer (2004), who, instead, finds 
a very small but positive effect of recognition rates on the inflows of asylum seekers to Western European 
countries during the period 1982-1999.  
A more precise indicator of countries’ policies on refugees is the Asylum Policy Index built by Hatton 
and Moloney (2015). It is based on 48 origin countries and 19 destinations – including the selected 14 OECD 
countries of this study – during 1997-2012; it varies between destinations and is constant across origins. Its 
values range between – 4 and 11, with higher numbers indicating more restrictive policies. I rescaled the index 
to positive values and transformed it in logs. Column 6 of Table 3 shows the effects of destination countries’ 
policies on asylum seeker inflows. The coefficient on the Asylum Policy Index has the expected sign and is 
significant at the 5% level: a 10% increase in the index reduces asylum applications by about 1.2%. In Hatton 
and Moloney (2015) the index is in levels and policies have stronger effects, but their dataset includes only 
origin countries with a number of asylum applicants strictly positive and higher than 300.  
Columns 2-6 in Table 3 show that coefficients on Bilateral Aid do not change significantly with the 
above controls concerning immigrant flows, refugee stocks, rates of rejection, and policy index. A further 
issue are zeros in the dependent variable: they correspond to about 22% of the total observations, which is not 
a proportion that should lead to biases in coefficients.9 However, to check for this possibility, I use the Pseudo 
Poisson Maximum Likelihood (PPML) method of estimation, proposed by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2010). 
With it, the dependent variable can be used in levels rather than in logs and zero values of asylum applications 
can be included as they are. Column 7 reports the PPML coefficients on bilateral Aid, the interacted variable, 
and other cofactors. Results remain very similar to previous specifications.  
                                                            
9  There is only one country-pair in one year (in 33,222) with zeros for both asylum seekers and bilateral Aid (Denmark-
Comoros). The proportion of zeros in the variable of interest, bilateral Aid, is 4.5%. 
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A possible check might consist in substituting missing observations of the dependent variable for zeros, 
and running the regressions on the augmented dataset. Missing values in asylum applications. However, this 
would be justified only if missing observations correspond to very low numbers of asylum seekers, but a check 
on the countries’ sources of data shows that they do not. Each country’s statistics depend on specific practices 
and methods of data collection, not on the magnitude of the flows. For example, OECD Population Statistics 
report figures from Canada only from year 1996, but national sources of statistics show that substantial 
numbers of asylum applicants and refugees were present in the country before that year. As similar evidence 
is available for other destinations, hence, I do not perform the substitution. 
 
V.4 Asylum seekers and immigrants. Policy implications.  
Do the same factors affect migrant and asylum seeker international movements? The question has clear 
implications for Aid policies, which could be implemented with the explicit goal of affecting asylum 
applicants, but have unintended effects on migrants, and hence on overall immigration. For example, Aid to 
some countries might deter asylum seekers but attract immigrants, or vice versa. Hence, tests on the respective 
determinants is useful to make clear the potential effects of policies. Given previous empirical findings, 
economic factors can be expected to have a leading role in influencing migrants’ decisions and political forces 
in influencing the choices of refugees and asylum seekers.  
Tables 4 and 5 reports results when the dependent variable is Immigrant inflows in country d from 
country o. Table 4 shows aggregate coefficients, Table 5 reports disaggregated results on the variable of 
interest, bilateral Aid, and the per capita GDP of the origin country. For reasons of space, Table 5 reports only 
the coefficients on the above two variables, but regressions include all cofactors, as well as time, country and 
country-pair effects. In the first column of Table 4, year, time and country-pair effects are controlled for, while 
columns 2-3 report coefficients of the more exacting specification that includes also destination*time effects, 
and hence captures the effects of destination country’s characteristics and policies.  
As expected, the determinants of immigrant inflows tend to differ from those of asylum seekers (of 
Tables 2-4). In the first place, our variable of interest, Bilateral Aid, does not influence immigrant inflows 
(columns 1-3, Table 4). The result is robust to the interaction of bilateral Aid with the average income of the 
origin country (column 3, Table 4). Hence, Aid to the poorest countries decrease asylum applications without 
affecting voluntary immigration. At a more disaggregated level, Bilateral Aid has a negative small and 
significant effect (coefficient -0.02, significance at 10%) on immigrants from North Africa (Table 5). This 
result does not provide support to Berthélemy et al. (2009) and Belloc (2015), where bilateral Aid encourages 
migration from, respectively, poor countries and Sub Saharan Africa. 
Moreover, development in the origin country has an inverted ‘U’ effect on immigrant inflows in the 
OECD economy: development initially boosts and subsequently curbs migration (columns 1-3, Table 4). It 
differs from the above results on asylum seekers, where development in the home country had an inverse 
effect on asylum applications. The result in Table 4 gives support to Faini and Venturini (1993), Clemens 
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(2014) de Haas (2011) and other studies, mentioned above, on migration. However, a more disaggregated 
analysis shows that the bell-shaped effect is heterogeneous across world areas. The coefficient on per capita 
income is significant only in some areas, and in one case, development has a ‘U’ effect on migration. 
Specifically, the turning point for the developing countries of North and Central America occurs to a per capita 
income of 3,500 US$, which is above the region average of 3,080 US$. In South and Central Asia, the turning 
point is at 3,093 US$, far above the average of 1,100 US$. Differently, in Eastern Europe the turning point 
was at 1,750 US$, while per capita income, of 3,015 US$, is already beyond this level. Hence, development 
in the home country boosts immigrant flows from South and Central Asia, from the developing economies of 
North and Central America and, at a decreasing speed, from Eastern Europe, but not from other world regions. 
Interestingly, the effect of per capita income on immigrants from South America follows the opposite pattern: 
it is ‘U’ shaped. Development decreases immigration. The turning point, at which immigration would start to 
increase, is well beyond the existing level of income: the function reaches a minimum at 13,000 US$, while 
the region per capita income is of 9,780 US$ (per capita GDP figures are in constant 2005 US$).  
A third difference between the determinants of immigrant and asylum seeker concerns the per capita 
income at destination, which significantly and positively influence immigrant inflows (coefficient is 0.35, 
significance at 5%; column 1 of Table 4). This marks a clear distinction between the two types of international 
movements: expected income is a strong pull factor for voluntary migrants, while the likelihood of being 
employed matters more for asylum seekers (average income at destination is not significant, or is negative in 
Tables 2-4). The positive effect of average income at destination for immigrants supports previous findings 
of the empirical literature (among others, Ortega and Peri, 2013; Mayda, 2010; Hatton and Williamson, 2005).  
Finally, also as expected, an important push factor for asylum seekers, political terror, exerts a weak 
effect on migrants: the coefficient on Political terror is 0.057 (columns 2-3 in Table 4), while it was 0.387 in 
the regressions with asylum seekers as dependent variable (column 6, Table 1). In both cases, significance is 
at 1%. The lack of Civil liberties is also a weaker push factor for immigrants than for asylum seekers: 
coefficients on the variable are 0.105 in the immigrants regression (columns 2-3, Table 4), and 0.208 in the 
asylum seekers regression (column 6, Table 1).  
 
VI. Summary and conclusions 
This paper measured the impact of bilateral Aid from 14 OECD donors to 113 developing countries on 
asylum seeker inflows during 1993-2013. Using this comprehensive dataset, I have found that bilateral Aid 
deter asylum seeker inflows from poor countries, with a per capita income below 1,400 constant 2005 US$ 
(which correspond to 9,150 PPP 2011 US$), and encourages them from medium-income developing 
economies. Most of the Aid deterring effects concern countries in Sub Saharan Africa. Bilateral Aid has also 
a regional indirect influence: transfers to the area surrounding an origin country can affect the asylum 
applications from that origin. These effects are negative in Sub Saharan Africa, reinforcing the deterring effect 
of Aid provided directly to the origin country, and are positive and significant in North Africa. However, Aid 
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to this region only attracts asylum seekers who have already fled the home country. Foreign Aid has also 
negative cross-donor effects: more Aid from other donors reduces the number of asylum applications in the 
OECD destination. A more restricted form of Aid, humanitarian Aid, has a linear negative effect on asylum 
seeker inflows: a 10% increase in bilateral humanitarian Aid reduces asylum applications by 0.2%.  
Further results are that lower levels of political terror and enhanced civil liberties, as well as higher 
levels of development, strongly reduce asylum applications. Hence, while the direct effect of bilateral Aid on 
asylum seeker inflows tends to be small, Aid transfers made conditional on improvements in the political and 
economic institutions of the recipient country can have a broader impact on asylum seeker inflows. 
This paper has also tested the impact of bilateral Aid on voluntary immigration. I found that Aid transfers 
have no effects on immigration. This implies that bilateral Aid transfers to the poorest countries, as well as 
bilateral humanitarian Aid, reduce asylum seeker inflows without encouraging immigration. Moreover, 
migration from Africa, the world region with the highest concentration of poor countries, decreases with 
development. More generally, improvements the political situation in the home country reduce both forced 
and voluntary migration. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
OLS FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE
Asylum applicationst-1 0.864*** 0.575*** 0.575*** 0.575*** 0.545*** 0.543*** 0.021** 0.005 -0.010
(0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.008)
Bilateral Aidt-1 0.003 0.008 0.007 -0.140*** -0.072 -0.103** -0.253*** -0.210*** -0.202***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.046) (0.052) (0.044) (0.071) (0.074) (0.063)
Bilateral Aidt-1*pc_GDP origin 0.021*** 0.013* 0.015** 0.038*** 0.029*** 0.028***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009)
ln_Distance_w -0.194***
(0.013)
Colony_45 0.145***
(0.031)
Immigrant stockst-10 0.136*** 0.016 0.016 0.014 -0.013 -0.008 0.197*** 0.208** 0.085*
(0.015) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034) (0.032) (0.035) (0.047) (0.082) (0.046)
Aid from all otherst-1 -0.038*** -0.079***
(0.010) (0.016)
pc_GDP origin -0.030*** -0.389*** 0.129 -0.434*** -0.460*** -0.326***
(0.007) (0.052) (0.258) (0.054) (0.050) (0.093)
pc_GDP origin^2 -0.037**
(0.019)
Population origin 0.013* 0.410*** 0.294** 0.422*** 0.413*** -0.041***
(0.007) (0.132) (0.147) (0.132) (0.123) (0.011)
Political_terror 0.232*** 0.375*** 0.375*** 0.375*** 0.387*** 0.318***
(0.026) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.031) (0.050)
Civil Liberties 0.050*** 0.208*** 0.201*** 0.206*** 0.208*** 0.122*
(0.019) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.043) (0.067)
Natural disasters -0.005 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Refugees other destinations 0.024*** 0.022*** 0.024*** 0.021*** 0.023*** -0.022**
(0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011)
pc_GDP destination -0.061 -1.573*** -1.566*** -1.541*** -1.601*** -2.396***
(0.040) (0.262) (0.262) (0.262) (0.227) (0.376)
Population destination 0.064*** -0.424 -0.429 -0.433 -0.205 -4.917***
(0.007) (0.350) (0.350) (0.350) (0.309) (0.563)
Unemployment rate -0.024*** -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.028*** -0.107***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.008)
Observations 19,385 19,385 19,385 19,385 19,450 19,385 14,573 10,426 14,573
R-squared 0.884 0.908 0.908 0.908 0.922 0.920 0.919 0.899 0.932
Time trend yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country-pair effects no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Origin effects no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Destination effects no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Origin*time no no no no yes no yes no yes
Destination*time no no no no no yes no yes yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered in country-pairs in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The panel is an unbalanced panel comprising data from 1993 to 2013. 
 Five year lag
Table 1. - Base specifications. Dependent variable: asylum applications.
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Table 2. - World regions. Dependent variable: asylum applications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Eastern 
Europe
North 
Africa
Sub 
Saharan 
Africa
South & 
Central 
Asia
Middle 
East
Far East 
Asia & 
Oceania
South 
America
North & 
Central 
America
Observ
ations
R-
squared
Bilateral Aidt-1 -0.837** -0.168 -0.290*** 0.110 0.038 0.278 0.277 -0.295
(0.352) (0.374) (0.067) (0.176) (0.318) (0.224) (0.307) (0.284)
Bilateral Aidt-1*pc_GDP_o 0.104** 0.023 0.044*** -0.011 -0.002 -0.032 -0.033 0.042
(0.042) (0.048) (0.010) (0.026) (0.041) (0.030) (0.038) (0.038)
pc GDP  origin -1.226*** -0.283 -0.374*** -0.461*** -0.580*** -0.536*** -1.383*** -0.213
(0.204) (0.297) (0.065) (0.092) (0.166) (0.127) (0.191) (0.187)
Total effect pc GDP origin -0.970*** -0.210 -0.290*** -0.457*** -0.567*** -0.614*** -1.419*** -0.122
(0.180) (0.269) (0.062) (0.078) (0.131) (0.088) (0.178) (0.173)
Model 2 Bilateral Aid area 0.031 0.104*** -0.034* 0.022 0.003 0.046 0.034 0.029 19,385 0.908
(0.026) (0.034) (0.020) (0.014) (0.023) (0.029) (0.024) (0.030)
Model 3 Aid from all others -0.143*** -0.129** -0.041** 0.180*** -0.057** -0.008 -0.110*** -0.035 19,385 0.908
(0.034) (0.053) (0.016) (0.040) (0.027) (0.021) (0.041) (0.047)
Model 4 Political terror 0.666*** 0.645*** 0.388*** 0.231** 0.414** -0.046 0.318*** 0.310*** 19,385 0.908
(0.122) (0.132) (0.041) (0.093) (0.169) (0.119) (0.109) (0.113)
Model 5 Civil Liberties 0.580*** -1.371*** 0.162*** 0.604*** 0.584*** 0.193 0.101 0.306* 19,385 0.908
(0.124) (0.245) (0.060) (0.172) (0.204) (0.172) (0.094) (0.171)
Model 6 Natural disasters 0.010 0.010 0.004 -0.043*** -0.010 -0.003 0.013 0.008 19,385 0.908
(0.019) (0.016) (0.005) (0.010) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.011)
Model 7 Unemployment rated -0.017 -0.006 -0.039*** -0.033*** -0.017 0.004 -0.024*** -0.013 19,385 0.908
(0.011) (0.012) (0.005) (0.008) (0.012) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010)
Model 8 pc GDP destination -2.909*** -0.499 -1.338*** -1.320*** -1.740*** -2.272*** -2.512*** -0.789** 19,385 0.908
(0.408) (0.445) (0.259) (0.312) (0.366) (0.345) (0.343) (0.373)
Model 9 Migrant stocks t-10 0.325*** 0.586** 0.021 -0.095 0.099 -0.062 -0.684*** 0.070
(0.098) (0.271) (0.041) (0.073) (0.149) (0.120) (0.144) (0.095)
Model 1 19,385 0.908
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered in country-pairs in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The panel is an unbalanced panel comprising data 
from 1993 to 2013. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Humanitarian 
Aid
Immigrant 
inflows
Refugee 
stocks Time periods
Prop. of 
rejected
HM policy 
index PPML
Asylum applications t-1 0.591*** 0.556*** 0.568*** 0.573*** 0.497*** 0.564*** 0.635***
(0.014) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.014)
Bilateral humanitarian Aidt-1 -0.025**
(0.010)
Bilateral Aidt-1 -0.093** -0.132** -0.129** -0.119** -0.103*
(0.046) (0.052) (0.051) (0.047) (0.061)
Immigrant inflows 0.047***
(0.009)
Refugee stocks -0.003
(0.009)
Bilateral Aidt-1 93-02 -0.155***
(0.056)
Bilateral Aidt-1 03-13 -0.154***
(0.046)
Proportion rejected -0.043
(0.049)
Asylum Policy Index -0.119***
(0.021)
Bilateral Aidt-1*pc_GDP origin 0.016** 0.022*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.038**
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.017)
Bilateral Aidt-1 93-02*pc_GDP origin 0.027***
(0.008)
Bilateral Aidt-1 03-13*pc_GDP origin 0.023***
(0.007)
Immigrant s tocks t-10 0.093 0.015 0.003 -0.001 0.052
(0.059) (0.034) (0.043) (0.034) (0.105)
Aid from all others t-1 -0.025* -0.044*** -0.051*** -0.044*** -0.028** -0.046*** 0.002
(0.014) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.021)
pc_GDP origin -0.343*** -0.481*** -0.469*** -0.448*** -0.596*** -0.479*** 0.147
(0.077) (0.056) (0.066) (0.054) (0.072) (0.055) (0.123)
Population origin 0.503** 0.576*** 0.437*** 0.503*** 0.510*** 0.449*** 0.700
(0.203) (0.136) (0.155) (0.143) (0.171) (0.137) (0.866)
Political_terror 0.432*** 0.325*** 0.378*** 0.366*** 0.303*** 0.385*** 0.318***
(0.051) (0.033) (0.039) (0.033) (0.036) (0.033) (0.085)
Civil Liberties 0.275*** 0.187*** 0.265*** 0.192*** 0.134** 0.197*** 0.392***
(0.078) (0.048) (0.057) (0.047) (0.056) (0.047) (0.140)
Natural disasters  -0.003 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 0.003 -0.002 0.004
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.011)
Refugees other destinations 0.006 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.023*** 0.033*** 0.019** 0.116**
(0.011) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.054)
pc_GDP destination 0.636 -1.234*** -1.494*** -1.549*** -2.987*** -1.941*** 0.516
(0.415) (0.261) (0.312) (0.262) (0.343) (0.284) (0.717)
Population destination 0.214 -0.881*** -2.018*** -0.467 -0.482 -0.101 -2.602
(0.515) (0.328) (0.418) (0.351) (0.414) (0.361) (2.037)
Unemployment r. destination -0.016*** -0.020*** -0.023*** -0.027*** -0.042*** -0.030*** -0.093***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.024)
Time trend yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
country_pair effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Origin effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Destination effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 9,460 18,473 15,516 19,385 14,893 19,086 19,173
R-squared 0.922 0.911 0.896 0.908 0.920 0.906 0.780
Notes: Robust s tandard errors  clustered in country-pairs  in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The panel is  an unbalanced panel 
comprising data from 1993 to 2013. 
Table 3. - Sensitivity. Dependent variable: Asylum applications
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Table 5. - Dep. variable: Immigrant inflows
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2)
Immigrant inflowst-1 0.608*** 0.588*** 0.588*** Bilateral Aid t-1 0.019
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Bilateral Aidt-1 0.001 -0.001 0.050 pc GDP origin 2.400***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.181) (0.715)
Bilateral Aidt-1*pc_GDP origin -0.007 pc GDP origin^2 -0.161***
(0.050) (0.045)
Bilateral Aidt-1*pc_GDP origin^2 -0.000 Bilateral Aid t-1 -0.020*
(0.003) (0.011)
Immigrant s tocks t-10 0.021 0.009 0.008 pc GDP origin 0.310
(0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (1.122)
Aid from all others t-1 -0.011 -0.010* -0.011* pc GDP origin^2 -0.030
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.072)
pc_GDP origin 0.644*** 0.754*** 0.783*** Bilateral Aid t-1 0.013
(0.174) (0.165) (0.202) (0.008)
pc_GDP origin^2 -0.046*** -0.053*** -0.054*** pc GDP origin 0.020
(0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.255)
Population origin 0.052 0.112 0.105 pc GDP origin^2 -0.010
(0.094) (0.089) (0.089) (0.019)
Political_terror 0.050** 0.057*** 0.057*** Bilateral Aid t-1 -0.008
(0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.011)
Civil Liberties 0.108*** 0.105*** 0.106*** pc GDP origin 2.170***
(0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.443)
Natural disasters  -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 pc GDP origin^2 -0.135***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.032)
Refugees other des tinations 0.023*** 0.025*** 0.025*** Bilateral Aid t-1 -0.009
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.015)
pc_GDP destination 0.353** pc GDP origin 1.637
(0.155) (1.543)
Population destination 1.700*** pc GDP origin^2 -0.110
(0.233) (0.099)
Unemployment des tination -0.023*** Bilateral Aid t-1 -0.014
(0.002) (0.009)
Time trend yes yes yes pc GDP origin -0.620
Time effects yes yes yes (0.418)
country_pair effects yes yes yes pc GDP origin^2 0.047
Origin effects yes yes yes (0.029)
Destination effects yes yes yes Bilateral Aid t-1 -0.017
Destination*time no yes yes (0.014)
Observations 19,461 19,461 19,461 pc GDP origin -2.172**
R-squared 0.957 0.962 0.962 (1.026)
pc GDP origin^2 0.115*
(0.062)
Bilateral Aid t-1 -0.005
(0.017)
pc GDP origin 3.052***
(1.088)
pc GDP origin^2 -0.187***
(0.065)
Observations 19,461 19,461
R-squared 0.957 0.957
Table 4. - Dependent variable: Immigrant inflows.
Notes: OLS, time and country-pair fixed effects  in all regressions.  Robust 
s tandard errors  clus tered in country-pairs  in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1
South 
America
North & 
Central 
America
Notes : OLS, time and country-pair fixed effects  in all 
regress ions.  Robust s tandard errors  clustered in country-
pairs  in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Eastern 
Europe
North Africa
Sub Saharan 
Africa
South & 
Central Asia
Middle East
Far Eas t Asia 
& Oceania
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Variable Definition Source
Asylum seekers Log of inflows of asylum seekers by nationality 
(from o to d), annual submissions. 
OECD Population Statistics, and UNHCR 
statistics
Aid Log of Official Development Assistance 
commitments (in 2013 US $)
OECD, International Development 
Statistics
Refugee stocks Log of number of refugees from origin to 
destination country each year
UNHCR Statistics
Immigrant stocks Log of number of migrants from origin to 
destination country, 1980, 1990, 2000.
World Bank, Bilateral Migration Database.
Immigrant flows Log of immigrant flows from origin to 
destination, each year. 
OECD, Bilateral Migration Statistics .
Distance Log of weighted distance, in thousand km, 
between origin and destination
CEPII 
www.cepii.fr/francgraph/bdd/distances.pdf
Proportion rejected share of rejected asylum applications on total 
applications in country d  from country o at 
time t .
UNHCR Statistics
Asylum Policy Index Log of composite index of policies concerning 
refugee status recognition. Varies between 1 
and 16, with higher numbers indicating more 
restrictive policies
Hatton Moloney (2016)
Population (o,d) Log of number of people in country o, d . World Bank - World Development 
Indicators
GDP (o, d). Log of Gross Domestic Product in country o, 
d . Constant 2005 US$.
World Bank - World Development 
Indicators
per capita GDP (o,d) Log of per capita Gross Domestic Product in 
country o, d . Constant 2005 US$.
World Bank - World Development 
Indicators
Political terror Scale from 1 to 5. Higher numbers indicate 
higher levels of political terror. 
The Political Terror Scale . 
http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/
Civil liberties Rating from 1 to 7:  1 represents the highest 
and 7 the lowest degree of civil liberties. 
Freedom House . 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/methodolog
y-freedom-world-2017
Natural Disasters Number of deaths. EM-DAT. The International Disaster 
Database. http://www.emdat.be/database
Unemployment rate 
destination
Unemployment rate in destination country International Labour Statistics.
Origin countries. Europe: ALB,BIH,BLR,MDA,MKD,MNE,SRB,TUR,UKR; North Africa: LBY , MAR, DZA, EGY, TUN; South of Sahara: AGO, BDI, BEN, BFA, BWA, 
CAF, CIV, CMR, COD, COG, COM, CPV, DJI, ERI, ETH, GAB, GAB, GHA, GIN, GMB, GNB, GNQ, KEN, RWA, SDN, SEN, SLE, SOM, TCD, TGO, TZA, UGA, ZAF, ZMB, 
ZWE, LBR, LSO, MDG, MLI, MOZ, MRT, MUS, MWI, NAM, NER, NGA; South and Central Asia: AFG, ARM, AZE, BGD, BTN, GEO, IND, KAZ, KGZ, LKA, MMR, NPL, 
PAK, TJK, TKM, UZB; Middle East: ARE, IRN, IRQ, JOR, LBN, SAU, SYR, YEM, KWT; Far East Asia: CHN, IDN, KHM, LAO, MNG, MYS, PHL, THA, VNM,PNG; South 
America: ARG, BOL, BRA, CHL, COL, GUY, PER, VEN, ECU; North and Central America: CUB, DMA, DOM, GTM, HND, HTI, JAM, NIC, SLV, TTO.
Table A.1 - Data definitions and sources
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Egypt 152.63 Serbia 3906 Iraq 355.14 Serbia 1597
China 83.77 El Salvador 2517 Afghanistan 219.58 Iraq 1495
Bosnia and 65.73 Turkey 2208 Nigeria 134.65 China 1385
Mozambiqu 61.66 Iraq 1977 Congo, D.R 130.78 Afghanistan 1253
Tanzania 57.70 Bosnia - He 1548 Ethiopia 95.28 Somalia 939
Indonesia 55.98 Guatemala 1490 Tanzania 87.89 Turkey 836
Côte d'Ivoir 54.51 Afghanistan 1363 Mozambiqu 81.45 Iran 743
Bangladesh 53.78 China 1273 Sudan 80.82 Pakistan 694
Papua New 50.93 Sri Lanka 1200 Pakistan 79.31 Nigeria 600
India 44.74 Somalia 1076 Kenia 63.82 Syria 543
Uganda 40.84 India 1001 Indonesia 62.55 Congo, D.R 531
Bolivia 40.60 Iran 984 India 62.52 Sri Lanka 530
Ethiopia 40.19 Pakistan 798 Uganda 59.12 Haiti 499
Vietnam 39.00 Congo, D.R 698 China 59.09 Eritrea 489
Cameroon 38.67 Haiti 647 Egypt 58.78 India 466
Zambia 37.29 Algeria 528 Colombia 55.70 Colombia 423
Nicaragua 36.94 Vietnam 462 Bangladesh 54.19 Armenia 354
Senegal 35.40 Nigeria 450 Vietnam 54.01 Algeria 350
Philippines 34.58 Armenia 431 Haiti 51.15 Bangladesh 306
Morocco 34.07 Albania 327 Serbia 50.06 Georgia 303
Table A.2 - Top 20 origin countries: Bilateral Aid and asylum seekers 
1993-2000 2001-2013
Notes: number of asylum seekers: yearly average in destination country. Bilateral Aid: yearly average in recipient 
country, in constant  million US$.
Bilateral Aid recipient 
Origin of Asylum 
seekers Bilateral Aid recipient 
Origin of Asylum 
seekers
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Bilateral Aid (mil constant  US$) 27,875 29.14 133.44 0 13021.8
Aid from all others (mil. constant US$ 31,976 667.75 1,038.43 2.44 25,330.12
Humanitarian Aid (mil. constant  US$) 11,830 6.60 30.86 0 823.61
Asylum seekers 27,184 229.99 1,120.55 0 75,138.00
Refugees 21,148 1,333.45 7,583.05 1 350,000.00
Immigrant stocks 32,634 5,518.01 3,186.36 0 14,513.14
Immigrant inflows 27,651 1,402.56 5,431.31 0 165,000.00
Distance 33,222 7,099.01 3,468.03 491.77 18,008.29
Colony_45 33,222 0.04 0.19 0 1
pc_GDP origin (constant 2005 US$) 31,990 2,656.16 5,019.76 68.57 46856.84
Population origin (mil.) 33,194 44.00 159.45 0.07 1357.38
Refugees other  destinations 32,858 89,473.83 312,136.00 0 3809767
Natural disasters (total deaths) 25,060 817.34 8,133.49 0 229566
Proportion rejected 22,148 58.22 3.34 53.13 63.98
Asylum Policy Index 26,894 7.15 2.85 1 16
Political terror 32,536 2.97 0.95 1 5
Civil liberties 32,816 4.38 1.53 1 7
pc_GDP destination (constant 2005 U 33,222 37,551.37 9,251.12 19,447.84 69,094.75
Population destination (mil.) 33,222 50.02 70.98 4.31 316.50
Unemployment r. destination 33,222 7.58 3.50 2.53 26.12
Table A.3  - Summary statistics
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OLS-FE PPML OLS-FE PPML
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bilateral Aidt-1 0.459*** 0.783*** 0.464*** 0.773***
(0.016) (0.023) (0.015) (0.025)
Asylum applicationst-1 0.010 0.004 0.004 -0.014
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.012)
Refugee stocks 0.015** 0.248*
(0.007) (0.127)
Immigrant stocks -0.135*** 0.172*** -0.143*** 0.173***
(0.035) (0.039) (0.035) (0.046)
Distance -0.044 -0.053
(0.033) (0.036)
Colony _45 0.171*** 0.186***
(0.049) (0.053)
pc_GDP origin -0.191*** -0.039 -0.237*** -0.034
(0.066) (0.028) (0.058) (0.031)
Population origin 0.572*** -0.064 0.616*** -0.072
(0.155) (0.049) (0.124) (0.052)
Political terror 0.085*** 0.424*** 0.140*** 0.495***
(0.033) (0.103) (0.035) (0.118)
Civil liberties -0.185*** -0.067 -0.234*** -0.097*
(0.052) (0.043) (0.053) (0.050)
Natural disasters 0.012*** 0.055*** 0.014*** 0.058***
(0.004) (0.012) (0.004) (0.013)
Refugees other destinations 0.009 0.024 0.026*** 0.019
(0.007) (0.017) (0.008) (0.019)
pc_GDP destination 0.627** 0.443*** 0.696** 0.412***
(0.294) (0.130) (0.283) (0.136)
Population destination 2.177*** 0.293*** 1.983*** 0.299***
(0.415) (0.038) (0.367) (0.041)
Unemployment r. destination -0.017*** 0.006 -0.014*** 0.008
(0.005) (0.019) (0.005) (0.022)
Observations 19,086 19,086 14,706 14,706
R-squared 0.242 0.635 0.835 0.643
Number of country_pair 1,382 1,382 1203 1,203
Robust standard errors clustered in country-pairs  in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. Time trend and time effects in all regressions. Country and country pair effects in OLS-
FE. The panel is an unbalanced panel comprising data from 1993 to 2013.
Table A.4 - Dependent variable: Bilateral Aid
